{"id":353,"date":"2016-11-03T15:35:50","date_gmt":"2016-11-03T15:35:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/dailystoic.com\/?page_id=353"},"modified":"2020-01-07T11:54:55","modified_gmt":"2020-01-07T16:54:55","slug":"glossary","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/dailystoic.com\/glossary\/","title":{"rendered":"Glossary"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Copyright \u00a9 2016 by Ryan Holiday and Stephen Hanselman. Used by permission of Penguin Random House. No reproducing, scanning, or distributing any part of it in any form without permission.<\/strong><\/em><\/h5>\n

A MODEL OF LATE STOIC PRACTICE AND GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS AND PASSAGES<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Late Stoic thought of the second century, as articulated in the writings of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, paints a vivid picture of the work of philosophy in producing both self-coherence and progress on the path to virtue. As suggested in the work of Pierre Hadot and A. A. Long (see Suggestions for Further Reading), we have developed and formalized Epictetus\u2019s three disciplines into a chart that presents the progressive nature of the late Stoic prescription for handling ourselves and our actions in the world. This chart brings together the three topoi<\/em> (topics, or fields of study) and three different levels of training (ask\u00easis<\/em>) suggested by Epictetus<\/a> and shows how they correlate (noted in Hadot) to the pursuit of virtue as expressed by Marcus Aurelius<\/a>. The chart itself comes from these key passages in Epictetus:<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

\u201cThere are three areas in which the person who would be wise and good must be trained. The first has to do with desires and aversions<\/em>\u2014that a person may never miss the mark in desires nor fall into what repels them. The second has to do with impulses to act and not to act<\/em>\u2014and more broadly, with duty\u2014that a person may act deliberately for good reasons and not carelessly<\/em>. The third has to do with freedom from deception and composure and the whole area of judgment, the assent our mind gives to its perceptions.<\/em> Of these areas, the chief and most urgent is the first which has to do with the passions, for strong emotions arise only when we fail in our desires and aversions.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u2014Epictetus, Discourses, 3.2. 1\u20133a<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

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\u201cThat\u2019s why the philosophers warn us not to be satisfied with mere learning<\/em>, but to add practice<\/em> and then training<\/em>. For as time passes we forget what we learned and end up doing the opposite, and hold opinions the opposite of what we should.\u201d\u2014Epictetus, Discourses, 2.9. 13\u201314<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

We have placed key terms in each level of the chart. There is progress (prokop\u00ea<\/em>) upward out of deception, false opinion, and error through impulse control\u2014to more clear judgments and knowledge (self-coherence); and there is progress across the levels of training (study\/manthan\u00f4<\/em>, practice\/meleta\u00f4<\/em>, hard training\/aske\u00f4<\/em>) through the remediation of habit, acting more appropriately, and improving judgment toward living the virtues. We offer an annotated glossary of key Stoic terms and passages following the chart.<\/p>\n

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\u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Adiaphora<\/em> (\u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1): indifferent things; neither good nor bad in an absolute moral sense. <\/strong>In Stoic thought, all things outside our sphere of reasoned choice (see prohairesis<\/em>) are indifferent. In a relative sense, some of the things outside our control are preferred or dispreferred goods (pro\u00eagmena<\/em>\/ apro\u00eagmena<\/em>). Marcus<\/a> says (5.20) that people who thwart the progress of our reasoned choice, although normally our natural concern, also become indifferent to us. The term appears in Epictetus\u2019s Discourses<\/em><\/a> seventeen times and once in Enchiridion<\/em><\/a>; see Discourses<\/em> 2.19. 12b\u201313 and 3.3.1. In Marcus it appears six times; see also 8.56 (my prohairesis<\/em> is indifferent to that of others, and vice versa).<\/p>\n

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Agathos<\/em> (\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c2): good, or a proper object of desire.<\/strong> Epictetus upholds the classic Stoic position when he says that the good (and evil) are only to be found in us, in our prohairesis<\/em>, not in external things (Discourses<\/em> 2.16.1), and when he says, \u201cGod laid down this law, saying: if you want some good, get it from yourself\u201d (1.29.4). \u201cProtect your own good in all that you do\u201d (4.3.11).<\/p>\n

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Anthr\u00f4pos<\/em> (\u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2): a human being, human beings in general. <\/strong>For Epictetus (Discourses<\/em> 2.10.1), above all we are human beings whose power of reasoned choice (prohairesis<\/em>) supervises all and is completely free. A \u201cbeautiful human being\u201d possesses the virtues (Discourses<\/em> 3.1. 6b\u20139). We must be a \u201cunified human being\u201d (Discourses<\/em> 3.15.13), what Hadot calls self-coherence (The Inner Citadel<\/em>, pp. 1 30\u201331). In Marcus (see 5.1, 5.20, 8.1, 8.5, 8.26), the term is used in conjunction with an emphasis on what our proper concern and work should be.<\/p>\n

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Apatheia<\/em> (\u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1): passionless calm, peace of mind. <\/strong>In verb form, \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c9 means to free from passion. Epictetus: Discourses<\/em> (seven times noun, eleven times verb), see 4.3.8; twice in Enchiridion<\/em>. Marcus uses it in verb form four times; see 6.16. 2b\u20134a. In its single use as a noun, he says that the closer a person is to apatheia<\/em>, the stronger they are (11.18.5b). See pathos<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Aphorm\u00ea<\/em> (\u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae): avoidance, disinclination, the impulse not to act (as a result of ekklisis<\/em>).<\/strong> Opposite of horm\u00ea<\/em>. Horm\u00ea\/Aphorm\u00ea<\/em> is the second of the three areas of training for Epictetus (3.2. 1\u20133a), and the term appears frequently in the Discourses<\/em>. Marcus doesn\u2019t use the term in this sense, only horm\u00ea<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Apotynchan\u00f4<\/em><\/strong> (\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03c5\u03b3\u03c7\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9): to fail in gaining, hitting, achieving; to miss one\u2019s purpose or to err. <\/strong>It appears twenty-four times in Epictetus, often with orexis\/ oreg\u00f4<\/em>; see especially 3.2. 1\u20133a. Diogenes Laertius says Zeno defined \u201cwant\u201d as failing to gain what we yearn for or reach out for (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em><\/a> 7.1.113). The term doesn\u2019t appear in Marcus. This experience is a fundamental source of disturbance in life. See also hamartan\u00f4.<\/em><\/p>\n

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Apro\u00eagmena<\/em> (\u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1): dispreferred things; indifferent in an absolute moral sense, but things of relative negative value and naturally undesirable things, such as illness. <\/strong>Opposite of pro\u00eagmena<\/em>. These terms don\u2019t appear in either Epictetus or Marcus, but we know from Diogenes Laertius that they were common Stoic teaching from Zeno and Chrysippus through Posidonius (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em> 7.1.102ff). Cicero rehearses Zeno\u2019s use of the terms and offers the Latin equivalents of reiecta<\/em>\/praeposita<\/em> (On the Ends of Good and Evil<\/em> and Academica<\/em>, 1.X. 36\u201339). Seneca<\/a> does not follow Cicero in this use, but uses commoda<\/em>\/incommoda<\/em> (advantageous\/disadvantageous). \u201cThere are things in life which are advantageous and disadvantageous\u2014both beyond our control\u201d (Moral Letters<\/em> 92.16). Cicero makes it a subclass of reiecta<\/em>\/praeposita<\/em> (On the Ends of Good and Evil<\/em> 3.21).<\/p>\n

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Aret\u00ea<\/em> (\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae): Virtue, goodness, and human excellence; the source of absolute value. <\/strong>Hadot notes that the four cardinal virtues of Plato are not fully present in Arrian\u2019s presentation of Epictetus (The Inner Citadel<\/em><\/a>, p. 238), but that in Marcus, who followed Epictetus closely, they have a clear articulation and correlation to what Hadot calls \u201cthe three acts of the soul\u201d (see chart). Diogenes Laertius says that the four cardinal virtues were primary for the Stoics (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em><\/a>, \u201cZeno,\u201d 7.92b): \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\/s\u00f4phrosun\u00ea<\/em>\/ self control,\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\/dikaiosun\u00ea<\/em>\/ justice, \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\/andreia<\/em>\/ courage, \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\/phron\u00easis<\/em>\/ wisdom. Chrysippus said that experiencing wisdom (phronimos<\/em>) for even a moment is equal to an eternity of exercising aret\u00ea<\/em> (Plutarch, Moralia<\/em> 1062). Musonius Rufus said, \u201cThe human being is born with an inclination toward virtue\u201d (Lectures<\/em> 1.7. 1\u20132). Marcus mentions all four virtues in 3.6.1 and 5.12, and three (without courage) in 7.63, 8.32, and 12.15. We present them here as the aims of moral progress to which all our activity in the world is directed. Marcus says we should let our virtues shine until we are extinguished (12.15). Epictetus does cite justice and self-control together in his discussion of virtue in 3.1. 6b\u20139, where his use of \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7 is milder in the \u201c even-tempered\u201d sense (contrasted by him with \u201cundisciplined\u201d), and his preferred term for s elf-control here (and elsewhere, appearing with wisdom\/ \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03bc\u1ff3 in 2.21.9) is \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2\/enkrateis<\/em>\/ mastery, or exercising control over (contrasted with \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2\/akrateis<\/em>\/ uncontrolled). Seneca uses the Latin virtus<\/em> and says that \u201cvirtue is the only good\u201d and is nothing less than \u201ctrue and steadfast judgment\u201d (Moral Letters<\/em><\/a> 7.32).<\/p>\n

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Ask\u00easis<\/em> (\u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): exercise, practice, disciplined training designed to achieve virtue. <\/strong>Epictetus sees three areas of training (Discourses<\/em> 3.2. 1\u20133a, 3.12.8)\u2014the famous doctrine of three topics (topoi<\/em>) that scholars think was Epictetus\u2019s unique contribution to late Stoicism (see Long\u2019s Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life<\/em><\/a>, pp. 112\u2013118; Hadot\u2019s The Inner Citadel<\/em>, pp. 8 9\u2013100). Before Epictetus, Seneca affirms the l ong-standing Stoic division of philosophy into three parts, which he calls \u201cthe moral, the natural, and the rational\u201d (Moral Letters<\/em> 89.9). Epictetus, we argue, also sees three levels of discipline, moving from learning\/ study (\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\/manthan\u00f4<\/em>, appearing seventy-nine times) to practice (\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c9\/meleta\u00f4<\/em>, appearing fifty-four times; see Discourses<\/em> 2.19. 29\u201334, where he says \u201clearn and diligently practice\u201d) to more rigorous training (\u1f00\u03c3\u03ba\u03ad\u03c9\/\u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, appearing forty times). For the three levels of discipline, see 2.9. 13\u201314. For Epictetus, the exercise and training analogies run from wrestling and athletics (see the \u201cinvincible athlete\u201d in 1.18. 21\u201323; \u201ctrue athlete in rigorous training\u201d in 2.18. 27\u20132), to the pankration<\/em> (3.10. 6\u20137), and the ultimate \u201chard winter training\u201d (\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\/cheimask\u00easai<\/em>) of soldiers (1.2.32, 4.8. 35\u201337). While each of these three areas of training and three levels of discipline reach into and inform one another, there is a clear sense of hierarchy in the acts of the soul, moving up from desire through action to assent, and of making forward progress in our actions in the world, from study to practice to hard training, toward virtue (see chart). For Marcus, who is often derisive of mere study, books, and displays of learning (2.2, 3.14, 5.5, 5.9), these words scarcely appear. He seems more interested in simply getting straight to putting things to the test in everyday life by following the dictates of our guiding reason (h\u00eagemonikon<\/em>). In this way he is very much in tune with Epictetus\u2019s memorable admonition against spouting what you\u2019ve learned without having digested it (see Discourses<\/em> 3.21. 1\u20133). For Marcus, the point of it all is to use our reason to produce in action the virtues of self-control, courage, justice, and wisdom, which correlate to the topoi<\/em> of Epictetus (see chart).<\/p>\n

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Ataraxia<\/em> (\u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1): tranquility, freedom from disturbance by external things. <\/strong>It is the fruit of following philosophy, according to Epictetus (Discourses<\/em> 2.1. 21\u201322). It appears fourteen times in the Discourses<\/em> and twice in the Enchiridion<\/em>; see Discourses<\/em> 2.2 (Arrian\u2019s caption of section), 2.18.28, 4.3. 6b\u20138, and 4.6. 34\u201335. It appears once in Marcus (9.31; not here).<\/p>\n

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Daim\u00f4n<\/em> (\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd): divine spirit within humans; our individual genius.<\/strong> Chrysippus held that a happy and well-flowing life was the result \u201cwhen the affairs of life are in every way tuned to the harmony between the individual divine spirit and the will of the director of the universe\u201d (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em> 7.1.88). Epictetus tells us never to worry because we are never alone: God is always within, as is our own daim\u00f4n<\/em> (Discourses<\/em> 1.14.14; not here).<\/p>\n

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Diairesis<\/em> (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): analysis, division into parts. <\/strong>Used when distinguishing what is subject to our power of choice from what is not.<\/p>\n

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Dianoia<\/em> (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1): thought, intelligence, purpose, faculty of mind. <\/strong>Haines notes: \u201cnot affected by the motions of the pneuma.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Dikaiosun\u00ea<\/em> (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7): justice, righteousness. <\/strong>Diogenes Laertius noted that for the Stoics, it meant \u201cbeing in harmony with the law and tending to bring people together\u201d (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em> 7.99; not here). It is one of the four cardinal virtues (i.e., s elf-control, justice, courage, and wisdom). The word is used seventeen times in Marcus, always in the spirit Diogenes Laertius outlines, where it appears with the other virtues (see especially 3.6, 5.12, 7.63, and 12.15). Epictetus is notable in 3.1. 6b\u20139, where he speaks of \u201cthe just\u201d as the kind of person we should strive to be.<\/p>\n

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Dogma<\/em> (\u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1): that which seems to one; opinion or belief; philosophically, dogmata<\/em> are principles or judgments established by reason and experience. <\/strong>Haines notes that \u201cwhat the sensations are to the body and impulses to the soul, dogmata<\/em> are to the intelligence.\u201d Epictetus takes aim at the untested form of dogmata<\/em> by framing them as \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, or oppressive or worthless opinions that must be rooted out by our reasoned choice (Discourses<\/em> 3.3. 18\u201319; see also 3.19. 2\u20133) before they destroy our inner fortress (4.1.86). The term appears more than one hundred times in Epictetus (see Enchiridion<\/em> 5, where he says that it\u2019s not things that disturb us, but our judgments\/ dogmata<\/em> about them) and twenty-three times in Marcus (see especially 4.49, 7.2, 8.1, 8.22, and 8.47, where he often talks about straightening out your principles). Marcus and Epictetus also use the word krima <\/em>(\u03ba\u03c1\u1fd6\u03bc\u03b1) when talking about decisions and judgment (Marcus, Meditations<\/em> 11.11, 8.47; Epictetus, Discourses<\/em> 4.11.7).<\/p>\n

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Dokimazein<\/em> (\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03c9): to assay; to put to the test; to thoroughly examine. <\/strong>This is a key verb in understanding Epictetus\u2019s Stoicism (found ten times in the Discourses<\/em> and once in the opening of the Enchiridion<\/em>), but it was not used by Marcus. The word carries the meaning of the assayist, one who tests fine metals and coins to verify their authenticity. In one of the most memorable passages in Epictetus, he compares our need to test impressions to what is done with coins and how the skilled merchant can hear a counterfeit coin cast upon a table just as a musician would detect a sour note (Discourses<\/em> 1.2. 7\u201311ff). See also the exercises he gives for handling impressions (Discourses<\/em> 2.18.24; Enchiridion<\/em> 1.5). As sense impressions need to be put to the test, so too our judgments (dogmata<\/em>\/the\u00f4r\u00eama<\/em>) need a tough cross-examination (\u1f10\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c7\u03c9; used by both Epictetus and Marcus) to be fully tested.<\/p>\n

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Doxa<\/em> (\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1): belief, opinion.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Ekklisis<\/em> (\u1f14\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): aversion; inclination away from a thing. <\/strong>The opposite of, but often appearing with, orexis<\/em>. This is the first level of self-coherence (see chart). Epictetus warns repeatedly that with aversions we must be careful to apply them only to our own concerns and not to those controlled by others (see Discourses<\/em> 4.1. 81\u201382ff; not here). The word appears fifty-three times in the Discourses<\/em>. In a vivid metaphor of a sparring match, Marcus tells us we can avoid people who might have ill intent without being suspicious toward them (6.20). In step with Epictetus, Marcus urges us to limit our aversion to only those things in our power (8.7). See orexis<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Ekpyr\u00f4sis<\/em><\/strong> (\u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): cyclical conflagration (birth and rebirth) of the universe.<\/strong> This idea, central to Stoic physics and cosmology, goes back to Heraclitus (Marcus 3.3; not here). Stoics equate this fire with the all-permeating reason (logos spermatikos<\/em>) of the universe (see Marcus 6.24).<\/p>\n

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Eleutheria<\/em> (\u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1): freedom, liberty. <\/strong>The masses say that only the free can be educated, but the Stoic says that only the educated can be free (Discourses<\/em> 2.1. 21\u201322). Including the adjectival form, it appears more than one hundred times in the Discourses<\/em>. Marcus uses the noun five times (see 5.9).<\/p>\n

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Eph\u2019 h\u00eamin<\/em> (\u1f10\u03c6\u2019 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd): what is up to us; what is in our control; our correct use of impressions, impulses, and judgments. <\/strong>The Enchiridion <\/em>(or Handbook<\/em>) of Epictetus<\/em> opens with this most famous of all Stoic phrases. Epictetus says when we want something outside our control, we are stricken with anxiety (Discourses<\/em> 2.13.1). Our judgments about what is up to us determine our freedom (3.26. 34\u201335).<\/p>\n

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Epist\u00eam\u00ea<\/em><\/strong> (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7): certain and true knowledge, over and above that of katal\u00eapsis<\/em>.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Ethos<\/em> (\u1f14\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2): custom or habit.<\/strong> See also hexis<\/em>. In late Stoic practice, there is a great focus on habit. Musonius Rufus\u2019s ideas about education were aimed at addressing the upbringing, environment, and habits that vary from person to person (Lectures<\/em> 1.1). Epictetus carries this focus on habit forward: \u201cSince habit is such a powerful influence, and we\u2019re used to pursuing our impulses to gain and avoid outside our own choice, we should set a contrary habit against that, and where appearances are really slippery, use the counterforce of our training\u201d (Discourses<\/em> 3.12.6). He also talks about the importance of using a contrary, opposing habit in 1.27.4. The term appears seventeen times in Epictetus\u2019s Discourses<\/em>. Marcus uses this term four times.<\/p>\n

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Eudaimonia<\/em> (\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1): happiness, flourishing, well-being. <\/strong>Epictetus says that God made human beings to be happy and stable\/ serene (\u03b5\u1f50\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\/eustathein<\/em>; Discourses<\/em> 3.24. 2b\u20133). Eudaimonia <\/em>appears thirteen times in the Discourses<\/em> and once in the Enchiridion<\/em>. Epictetus holds that it is incompatible with yearning for what we don\u2019t have (Discourses<\/em> 3.24.17). It appears twice in Marcus (7.67) in conjunction with \u201clife,\u201d which, he says, depends on the fewest possible things (see also 7.17). Marcus has one other equivalent word in his use of \u03b5\u1f50\u03b6\u03c9\u1f75\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\/euz\u00f4\u00easeis<\/em>, or \u201chappy in life\u201d (3.12; none of these three reproduced here).<\/p>\n

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Eupatheia<\/em> (\u03b5\u1f50\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1): good passions or emotions (as contrasted with pathos<\/em>), the result of correct judgments and virtuous actions.<\/strong> Diogenes Laertius says, \u201cThe Stoics assert there are three good emotional states (eupatheia<\/em>): joy, caution, and wishing . . . joy is rational elation . . . caution is rational avoidance . . . wishing is rational inclination . . . under wishing they place goodwill, benevolence, friendliness and affection; under caution, respect and modesty; under joy, delight, good cheer and contentment\u201d (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em> 7.116).<\/p>\n

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H\u00eagemonikon<\/em> (\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd): ruling or guiding reason; ruling principle. <\/strong>A. A. Long says the term, meaning \u201csuited to command,\u201d was borrowed from Isocrates, the Athenian rhetorician, and was taken up by the early Stoics to represent the intellectual part of the soul as distinct from the senses (Greek Models of Mind and Self<\/em>, p. 89). Long notes that by the time of the late Stoics, Epictetus had applied it even to the souls of animals, which lack rationality (Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life<\/em><\/a>, p. 211), and said it means \u201cthe governing faculty of the mind.\u201d Hadot calls it the superior or guiding part of the soul. Marcus uses it as a unique property of human beings (especially in 12.1 and 12.33). Epictetus\u2019s Discourses<\/em> (twenty-six references): 1.26.15, 1.20.11, 4.4.43, 4.5.5. Marcus Aurelius (forty-six references): 3.9, 4.38, 5.11, 8.48, 8.56, 9.22, 9.26, 12.1, 12.33. Whereas Epictetus leans heavily on prohairesis<\/em>, Marcus prefers h\u00eagemonikon<\/em>: \u201cHow does your ruling reason manage itself? For in that is the key to everything. Whatever else remains, be it in the power of your choice or not, is but a corpse and smoke\u201d (12.33).<\/p>\n

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Heimarmen\u00ea<\/em> (\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7): fate, destiny. <\/strong>Stoics were compatibilists about the free will and determinism question\u2014all things are determined, but our response is entirely our own. See pronoia<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Hexis<\/em> (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2): abstract noun built on echein<\/em>, to have, possess; a state of mind or habit, disposition toward something; of physical things, a natural property or tendency. <\/strong>Epictetus says that habits must be \u201cfirst weakened and then obliterated\u201d (Discourses<\/em> 2.18. 11b\u201314); otherwise, they become fuel for personal destruction (2.18. 4\u20135). See ethos<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Horm\u00ea<\/em> (\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae): positive impulse or appetite toward an object (as a result of orexis<\/em> and our assent) that leads to action; the opposite of aphorm\u00ea<\/em>.<\/strong> These can be irrational impulses to act or a reasoned choice to act or exert effort toward an end. Quoting Epictetus, Marcus says that we \u201cmust pay special attention to the sphere of our impulses\u2014that they are subject to reservation (\u03bc\u03ad\u03b8\u1fbd \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03be\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), to the common good (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af), and that they are in proportion to actual worth (\u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd)\u201d (11.37). This is the second level of self-coherence that gives rise to our actions (see chart). Marcus repeatedly ties the discipline of horm\u00ea<\/em> to acts for the common good (see also 8.7) and the claims of justice (4.22). It appears thirty-four times in Epictetus\u2019s Discourses<\/em>, three times in the Enchiridion<\/em>, and thirty-five times in Marcus. Seneca uses the Latin equivalent impetus<\/em> seventy-nine times in his letters (see Moral Letters<\/em> 71.32, where he says virtue resides in our judgment, which gives rise to impulse and clarifies all appearances that give rise to impulse).<\/p>\n

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Hul\u00ea<\/em> (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7): matter, material. <\/strong>This is a very common reference in Epictetus, appearing more than forty times, usually with the analogy of the material that craftspeople use as a way of talking about where our own focus should be, and where the evidence of our progress will be seen in the art of living (Discourses<\/em> 1.15.2). He calls external things the raw material of our prohairesis<\/em> (1.29. 1\u20134a); elsewhere he says, \u201cThe raw material for the work of a good and excellent person is their own guiding reason (h\u00eagemonikon<\/em>)\u201d (3.3.1). The term appears nineteen times in Marcus; see especially 8.35, where he talks about how we can \u201cconvert any obstacle into the raw material for our own purpose.\u201d Sometimes used interchangeably with ousia<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Hypol\u00eapsis<\/em> (\u1f51\u03c0\u1f79\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2): literally \u201ctaking up\u201d an opinion, assumption, conception, notion, understanding. <\/strong>Hadot translates the term as \u201cvalue judgment\u201d and sees a movement upward into higher-level value judgments, from prol\u00eapsis<\/em> to hypol\u00eapsis<\/em> to katal\u00eapsis<\/em>. See Marcus 4.3.4b and 9.13, where he talks about how our own assumptions can crush us, so we must throw them out. He also says that \u201ceverything turns on our assumptions\u201d (12.22), and we should hold our power for understanding, or forming opinions, sacred (3.9). The term appears eight times in Epictetus\u2019s Discourses<\/em> (see 2.19. 13\u201314, where he says we hold opinions the opposite of what we should) and three times in the Enchiridion<\/em> (see 20, where he talks about how our own opinions or assumptions are what fuel anger).<\/p>\n

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Kalos<\/em> (\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03c2): beautiful; in the moral sense, noble, virtuous.<\/strong> Seneca\u2019s equivalent term, used quite frequently, is honestum<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Katal\u00eapsis<\/em> (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2): true comprehension, clear perception, and firm conviction needed for right conduct.<\/strong> Hadot translates the term as \u201cperception\u201d or \u201cobjective representation.\u201d This is a prominent term for Epictetus and stands in contrast to the Skeptic\u2019s notion that nothing could be known with certainty (\u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f71\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2). Epictetus says that true progress (prokop\u00ea<\/em>) is about giving assent (see synkatathesis<\/em>) only where there is katal\u00eapsis<\/em> (Discourses<\/em> 3.8.4). Marcus uses the term in praising the character of Antoninus and his zeal for \u201cgetting a true grasp of affairs\u201d (6.30.2), as well as in 4.22, where he says every impulse should be subject to the claims of justice and keeping our convictions clear.<\/p>\n

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Kath\u00eakon<\/em> (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd): duty, appropriate action on the path to virtue. <\/strong>Diogenes Laertius says that Zeno was the first philosopher to use the term as relating to conduct in the sense of being incumbent upon an actor (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em>, \u201cZeno,\u201d 7.108). Marcus says that every duty in life is a sum of acts that deserve methodical attention (6.26).<\/p>\n

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Koinos<\/em> (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2): common, shared in common.<\/strong> As Haines noted, this term and its cognates appear more than eighty times in Marcus, and it is a very central part of his thinking and ethical orientation. Community, partnership, fellowship, neighborliness, and cooperation are all heavily emphasized in terms ranging from \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 (5.16, and \u201caction for the common good in the present moment\u201d in 9.6) to his own coined word \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7, regard for the feelings of others (1.16). In 6.30, Marcus tells us, \u201cLife is short\u2014the fruit of this life is a good character and acts for the common good.<\/em>\u201d See also his morning ritual to remind ourselves that we\u2019ve \u201cbeen made by nature for the purpose of working with others\u201d (8.12). A related common term appearing in both Marcus and Epictetus is the word \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\/ all\u00eal\u00f4n<\/em>, which stresses how we are made \u201cfor each other\u201d or \u201cfor one another\u201d (twenty-six times in Marcus, especially 5.16 and 6.38; and twenty times in Epictetus, notably 2.20).<\/p>\n

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Kosmos<\/em> (\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2): all-encompassing order, world, universe.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Logos\/ Logikos<\/em> (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\/ \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2): reason or rational; the ordering principle of the cosmos. <\/strong>Logos spermatikos<\/em> (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2) is the generative principle of the universe, which creates and takes back all things (see Marcus 6.24).<\/p>\n

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Nomos<\/em> (\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2): law, custom.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Oi\u00easis<\/em> (\u03bf\u1f34\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): conceit, s elf-deception, illusion, arrogant opinion or notion. <\/strong>Epictetus says (3.14.8) that two things must be rooted out of every human being: self-deception and mistrust\/ timidity (apistia<\/em>). Our conceit, arrogance, and false opinions are what must be removed (2.17.1), along with passion (pathos<\/em>). Epictetus sees a movement from preconception (prol\u00eapsis<\/em>) through conception (hypol\u00eapsis<\/em>) to our more firmly formed convictions (katal\u00eapsis<\/em>), and all can be subject to error (hamartia<\/em>). Heraclitus called self-deception \u201can awful disease\u201d (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em>, 9.7), and the Stoics offered their practices for overcoming it.<\/p>\n

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Oikei\u00f4sis<\/em> (\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): s elf-ownership, appropriation to the individual\u2019s or species\u2019 needs. <\/strong>There is only one instance of this noun in Epictetus (Discourses<\/em> 1.19.15), which pertains to self-preservation, although it appears in a discussion of \u201cthe common interest.\u201d Marcus also has one use, and it moves explicitly to the other pole of appropriation\u2014namely, to that which lends to the \u201ccare for others\u201d or human fellowship (3.9), and our ruling reason is what enables us to keep in accord with nature and effect such appropriation. The related verbal and adjectival forms of \u201cappropriating\u201d and being \u201cfitting or appropriate\u201d are more common to both.<\/p>\n

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Orexis<\/em> (\u1f44\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2): desire, inclination toward a thing. <\/strong>The opposite of ekklisis<\/em>. In Aristotle this was understood as \u201cappetence\u201d and was something shared with animals and different from purposive choice (prohairesis<\/em>), which involved both reason and deliberation. Epictetus says if we want to be free, we shouldn\u2019t desire something in someone else\u2019s control (Discourses<\/em> 1.4. 18\u201322). Orexis<\/em>\/ekklisis<\/em> are the subject of the first of the three topoi<\/em>, or areas of training that produce self-coherence, the other two being horm\u00ea<\/em>\/ aphorm\u00ea<\/em> and synkatathesis<\/em> (3.2. 1\u20133a). The word appears fifty-six times in the Discourses<\/em> and seven times in the Enchiridion<\/em>. It appears five times in Marcus, once in saying principles need to be the source of desire and action (8.1.5) and be limited to only what\u2019s in our control (8.7). The verb form, \u1f40\u03c1\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9\/ oreg\u00f4<\/em>, meaning to reach out for, yearn for, often appears and in many instances it occurs with \u201cnot missing the mark\u201d; see hamartan\u00f4<\/em> and apotynchan\u00f4<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Ousia<\/em> (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1): substance or being, sometimes used interchangeably with hul\u00ea<\/em> (matter, material). <\/strong>Marcus speaks vividly of substance being \u201clike a river\u2019s unending flow, its activities constantly changing and causes infinitely shifting so that almost nothing at all stands still\u201d (5.23), harkening back to Heraclitus (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em>, 9.8).<\/p>\n

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Paideia<\/em> (\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1): training, teaching, and education. <\/strong>Aske\u00f4,<\/em> manthan\u00f4<\/em>, and meleta\u00f4 <\/em>(see chart) are each a part of getting an education as outlined by Epictetus in Discourses<\/em> 2.9. 13\u201314. The daily disciplines are central to being educated for the Stoic, and only the educated are truly free (2.1. 21\u201323 and 1.22. 9\u201310a). Working over our preconceptions (prol\u00eapsin<\/em>) is the point of education (1.2. 5\u20137).<\/p>\n

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Pathos<\/em> (\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2): passion or emotion, often excessive and based on false judgments. <\/strong>Haines places passion as the \u201caffect\u201d following from horm\u00ea<\/em> that lead to acts against nature. The four passions divide into two types: (1) for things not in present possession or anticipated in the future, which are desire (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1) and fear (\u03c6\u03cc\u03b2\u03bf\u03c2); and (2) for things presently engaging a person, which are pleasure (\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae) and distress (\u03bb\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7). Epictetus states the Stoic position most clearly in Discourses<\/em> 4.1.175: \u201cFreedom isn\u2019t secured by filling up on your heart\u2019s desire but by removing your desire.<\/em>\u201d Diogenes Laertius says that Zeno defined passion\/ emotion as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or as excessive horm\u00ea<\/em> (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em> 7.110). Despite the popular misconception, the Stoics did celebrate certain passions as good (eupatheia<\/em>), if in rational bounds: in particular, joy, caution, and wishing (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em> 7.116).<\/p>\n

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Phantasia<\/em> (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1): impression, appearance, perception. <\/strong>Epictetus says (1.1. 7\u20139) that the gods gave us one power that governs all the rest\u2014\u201cthe ability to make the right use of appearances.\u201d He also says that the first and greatest task of the philosopher is to test (\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03c9, \u201cto assay\u201d) and separate appearances (see also 2.18.24). He uses the metaphors of sweeping currents, battle, and the rigorous training of an athlete for the work we must do to hold our own against impressions (2.18. 27\u201328). \u201cThe task of the good and excellent person is to handle their impressions in harmony with nature\u201d (3.3.1). There are more than two hundred references to phantasia<\/em> in the Discourses<\/em> and nine in the Enchiridion<\/em> (34). The term appears about forty times in Marcus\u2019s Meditations<\/em> (5.2, 5.16, 6.13, 8.7, 8.26, 8. 28\u201329). Marcus has a great exercise for not telling yourself more than initial impressions (\u201creport\u201d in 8.49).<\/p>\n

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Phron\u00easis<\/em> (\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): practical wisdom, one of the four cardinal virtues. <\/strong>The term is used repeatedly by Marcus, most memorably in 4.37, where he says that \u201cwisdom and acting justly are one and the same,\u201d and in 5.9, where he says \u201cthere is nothing so pleasing as wisdom itself.\u201d See ar\u00eate<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Physis<\/em> (\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): nature, the natural order; of things, species, or kind: characteristic. <\/strong>Both Epictetus and Marcus repeatedly state that we must use our ruling principle to keep ourselves in harmony with nature (Discourses<\/em> 4.4.43; Marcus 3.9). In Stoic thought, God and nature are one.<\/p>\n

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Pneuma<\/em> (\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1): air, breath, spirit; a principle in Stoic physics.<\/strong> The part of the soul set into disturbance by desires and aversions, which Haines calls the inferior part of the soul, distinct from nous<\/em> (mind). Epictetus has a memorable image in Discourses<\/em> 3.3. 20\u201322, where he talks about the movement of a disturbed bowl of water being like the spirit in which things exist.<\/p>\n

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Pro\u00eagmena<\/em> (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1): preferred things; indifferent in an absolute moral sense, but of relative positive value, naturally desirable things, such as health. <\/strong>Opposite of apro\u00eagmena<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Prohairesis<\/em> (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): reasoned or deliberative choice, our free will to choose, the sphere of choice. <\/strong>The term goes back to Aristotle\u2019s Ethics <\/em>and has been traditionally translated there as \u201cpurposive choice.\u201d A. A. Long, in an attempt to free it from modern moral concepts, translates it as \u201cvolition,\u201d a term we find too remote from everyday understanding\u2014for generations prior it was translated as \u201cmoral purpose\u201d (W. A. Oldfather, George Long, and others). We are avoiding loading the term with either the moral<\/em> sense of Christian tradition or the modernist sense of will<\/em>, so heavily colored since Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. A. A. Long sees this as Epictetus\u2019s preferred term for what distinguishes human beings from animals (which also have h\u00eagemonikon<\/em> in his reading of Epictetus; Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life<\/em>, p. 211), something not even the gods can touch (Discourses<\/em> 1.1.23). The term is used sixty-nine times in the Discourses<\/em> (1.4. 18\u201322, 1.18. 21\u201323, 1.22.10, 1.29. 1\u20134a, 2.1. 12\u201313, 2.5. 4\u20135, 2.6.25, 2.10.1, 2.16. 1\u20132a, 2.22. 19\u201320, 3.1. 39b\u201340a, 3.3. 18\u201319, 3.7.5, 3.10.18, 3.19. 2\u20133, 3.21. 1\u20133, 3.22.13, 4.4.23, 4.5. 34\u201337) and six times in the Enchiridion<\/em> (13). Marcus uses it five times in the negative (\u1f00\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u1f77\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1), or outside of our choice, and three times in the positive sense of deliberate choice (3.6, 6.41, 8.56, 12.3, 12.33). Where this is the focal point of Epictetus\u2019s system, Marcus leans heavily to h\u00eagemonikon<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Prokop\u00ea<\/em> (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03ae): progress or improvement; on the path toward the virtues of s elf- control, courage, justice, and wisdom. <\/strong>See Epictetus, Discourses<\/em> 1.4, captioned \u201con progress,\u201d especially 1.4. 18\u201322; also 3.19. 2\u20133. The word appears fourteen times in Epictetus (most often in 1.4). Hanging out with the wrong people can limit our progress, according to Epictetus (4.2. 1\u20135), and Musonius Rufus reminds us of the same (Lectures<\/em> 11.53. 21\u201322; losing our soul).<\/p>\n

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Prol\u00eapsis<\/em> (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2): a primary conception, or preconception, possessed by all rational beings. <\/strong>Epictetus talks about keeping them ready like polished weapons (Discourses<\/em> 4\u20135a, 6b). See also 1.22 and 1.2. 5\u20137, where he talks about working over our preconceptions and the true meaning of education.<\/p>\n

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Pronoia<\/em> (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1): foreknowledge, foresight, divine providence. <\/strong>Epictetus says we can praise providence if we have two qualities: seeing things clearly and gratitude (1.6. 1\u20132). Marcus talks about entrusting the future to providence in 12.1. The word appears ten times in Epictetus (see 3.17.1) and twelve times in Marcus.<\/p>\n

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Prosoch\u00ea<\/em> (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae): attention, diligence, soberness. <\/strong>See especially Discourses<\/em> 4.12. 1\u201321. In 1.20. 8\u201311, Epictetus says it is particularly needed for things that might steer us wrongly. Marcus uses the term once in the body of his Meditations<\/em> in speaking about what a short time we have in life to keep indifferent things from consuming our attention (11.16; not here).<\/p>\n

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Psych\u00ea<\/em> (\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae): state of mind, soul, life, living principle. <\/strong>It appears forty-three times in the Discourses<\/em>, and the laconic Marcus uses it sixty-nine times in his Meditations<\/em>. Marcus has a beautiful image of the rational soul as a sphere in 11.12 (not here); Epictetus sees it as a bowl of water in 3.3. 20\u201322. Seneca\u2019s term is animus<\/em>, the rational soul. The Stoics were materialists, so the soul itself has substance.<\/p>\n

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Sophos<\/em> (\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2): wise person, virtuous sage, and the ethical ideal of a practicing Stoic.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Sympatheia<\/em> (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1): sympathy, affinity of parts to the organic whole, mutual interdependence.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Synkatathesis<\/em> (\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2): assent; approval to impressions, conceptions, and judgments, enabling action to take place.<\/strong> See Marcus quoting Epictetus in 11.37 (in verb form) and how it relates to katal\u00eapsis<\/em>; also, in 5.10 Marcus talks about how every assent to impressions is subject to error. This is the third level of s elf-coherence, concerning the will and judgment and what we choose to reject (see chart). It appears eight times in noun form and twenty-one times in verb form in Epictetus: 3.2. 1\u20133a, 3.8.4, and 4.11. 6\u20137.<\/p>\n

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Techn\u00ea<\/em> (\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7): craft, art in the sense of profession or vocation. <\/strong>Marcus says our techn\u00ea<\/em> is to be a good human being (11.5). Epictetus uses the analogies of crafts and trades quite often, particularly in drawing focus to the proper material of our work as human beings.<\/p>\n

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Telos<\/em> (\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2): the end goal or objective of life.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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The\u00f4r\u00eama<\/em> (\u03b8\u03b5\u03ce\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1): general principle or perception, a truth of science; used interchangeably with dogmata<\/em> in discussing the mind\u2019s store of judgments.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Theos<\/em> (\u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2): god; the divine, creative power that orders the universe and gives human beings their reason and freedom of choice.<\/strong> As far as theology goes, despite reflecting the polytheism of their culture and making references to gods of all stripes, the late Stoics were monists and pantheists: God = nature. Further, they were materialists, so even the divine spark in us\u2014and the soul\u2014are corporeal. Epictetus was a Phrygian by birth and had a very vivid, personalistic view of God. He referred to God as a kindly father (see particularly Discourses<\/em> 1.6, 3.24). A. A. Long, the foremost scholar of Epictetus, put it this way: \u201cWhether [Epictetus] speaks of Zeus or God or Nature or the gods, he is completely committed to the belief that the world is providentially organized by a divine power whose creative agency reaches its highest manifestation in human beings\u201d (Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life<\/em>, p. 134). Long thinks Epictetus was reviving Cleanthes\u2019s (successor to Zeno) strong religious sense. There is no transcendent god for any of the Stoics\u2014a key difference from Christianity. Epictetus says we must seek to bind up our choice with the will of God (Discourses<\/em> 4.1.89). Marcus tends to refer to the divine in a looser, often more polytheistic way (see 9.1.1), but he shares Epictetus\u2019s views, especially when he says, \u201chold sacred your capacity for understanding,\u201d a gift from God requiring obedience to God (3.9). Seneca, too, speaks often of the divine in plural, but all three are agreed that we must accept fate and seek to correct our own faults rather than blame others or the gods (Moral Letters<\/em> 107.12).<\/p>\n

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Tonos<\/em> (\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2): tension, a principle in Stoic physics accounting for attraction and repulsion; a way of seeing what gives rise to virtue and vice in the soul.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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A WORD ON THE\u00a0TRANSLATIONS, REFERENCES, AND SOURCES<\/strong><\/h3>\n

All\u00a0the translations in this volume were rendered with the aid of two primary and indispensable sources. The first is the incomparable treasure of the Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University Press), which has been the standard resource for the original language texts for generations. Today, in addition to the handsome green and red printed volumes loved by many, the full Greek and Latin texts are now available via online subscription, with terrific search capabilities in both languages, as well as in English for the general reader, at www.loebclassics.com<\/a>. I have found this service to be a godsend in organizing and managing my work. From a lexical standpoint, the resources at www.perseus.tufts.edu have proved to be invaluable, offering, in addition to search capabilities, links to the superlative lexicon of Liddell and Scott (Greek) and the dictionary of Lewis and Short (Latin), along with comparative usage statistics and occurrences across authors and time periods. I also used extensively the print editions of both works (Oxford University Press) for particularly challenging passages and for source texts not available online (Musonius Rufus). Of course, the translations were informed by the excellent work of Loeb translators W. A. Oldfather, C. R. Haines, Richard M. Gummere, John W. Basore, and others. In the case of Epictetus, I especially enjoyed consulting the works of Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a fellow Harvard divinity graduate, and George Long (both available in print and at www.perseus.tufts.edu). There have been quite a few more recent translations of Marcus Aurelius, and among them Ryan and I both enjoy the lyrical Gregory Hays (Modern Library); for a more literal modern rendering, particularly for precision with philosophical terms, the Robin Hard translation (Oxford University Press) is hard to beat.<\/p>\n

With regard to the translations, the goal was to make the work of\u00a0these late Stoic thinkers as accessible, digestible, and coherent as possible. In the major terms of Stoic thought and its development in Epictetus and Marcus, my effort has been placed on consistency and avoiding anachronism while pointing out any places of difference in emphasis or use as necessary. Apart from the core terminology, the translations have been made with an aim to remain as literal as possible, with only a few liberties taken when needed to make a point stand out or to avoid repeated images or phrases. A special thanks to Amanda C. Gregory for her review of my glossary and translations.<\/p>\n

All source and line references given, unless otherwise noted, are to the original texts as found on www.perseus.tufts.edu<\/a>, and most of the remaining ones are to the Loeb texts (online version, which occasionally differs from the printed editions in line numbering). The pieces from Musonius Rufus came from an edition of the Greek text in Cora Lutz\u2019s 1947 work, Musonius Rufus, Lectures and Fragments<\/em> (Yale), which I procured from a reprinter in India (but it contains only the Lectures<\/em> and is missing her introduction, the Fragments<\/em>, and much of the textual notes). I have spoken with the director of Yale University Press about possibly bringing that work back into print, and it is under review.<\/p>\n

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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING<\/h3>\n

In addition to the Loeb Classics and online resources at www.perseus.tufts.edu<\/a> and the other printed translations mentioned previously, there are a handful of exceptional recent works by accessible scholars that you should read:<\/span><\/p>\n

What Is Ancient Philosophy<\/a>?<\/em> Translated by Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, new edition, 2004).<\/p>\n

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Hadot, Pierre. The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius<\/em><\/a>, translated by Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).<\/p>\n

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Long, A. A. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life<\/em><\/a> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).<\/p>\n

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Greek Models of Mind and Self<\/em><\/a> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).<\/p>\n

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Nussbaum, Martha. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics<\/em><\/a> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, reissued 2009).<\/p>\n

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Robertson, Donald. The Philosophy of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy<\/em><\/a> (London: Karnac Books, 2010).<\/p>\n

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Explore Our Daily Stoic Store<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Hamartan\u00f4<\/em> (\u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9): to do wrong, err, fail one\u2019s purpose. <\/strong>The verb appears twenty- eight times in Epictetus and t hirty-four times in Marcus. Also, hamartia<\/em> (\u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1)\u2014a failure, fault, error, to do wrong to a nother\u2014appears three times in Marcus, notably in 10.30, when he talks about seeing another\u2019s wrongdoing from the standpoint of our own failings. Both Epictetus and Musonius Rufus often use the obverse as the ideal, being free from error, anamart\u00eatos<\/em> (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2), which, although not possible, is what we should strive for (see especially Discourses<\/em> 4.12.19; Lectures<\/em> 2.5.1). Since Aristotle<\/a>\u2019s Poetics<\/em>, the concept had been the fatal flaw or decision that leads to a tragic demise. The Stoics part ways with any tragic thinking, on the one hand, and, on the other, with any notion of original sin\u2014all sin is the result of bad habit, following common opinion, and bad judgments. Philosophy is meant to help us scrape the accumulated errors of existence from our souls.<\/p>\n

Axia<\/em> (\u1f00\u03be\u1f77\u03b1): the true value or worth of things; the relative value of things preferential; of people, meaning reputation or what\u2019s deserved. <\/strong>It appears eighteen times in Marcus; see 4.32, 5.1, 5.36, 9.1.1, and 12.1. Marcus quotes Epictetus on this concept in discussing how to use the power of assent in the area of our impulses (11.37). For Epictetus, the term appears twenty-nine times in the Discourses<\/em> and twice in Enchiridion<\/em> (36; not here). See Discourses<\/em> 1.2. 5\u20137, 4.1.170, 4.3. 6\u20138, and 4.5. 34\u201337. Overall, the idea is that we too often trade things of great value for things of very little value, an idea that goes back to the teachings of Diogenes of Sinope, the founder of the Cynic school, as described by Diogenes Laertius (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers<\/em><\/a> 6.2.35b).<\/p>\n